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I intend to demonstrate that many of the epistemological issues central to the sociology of knowledge are on parade in Duchamp's work. There at least three reasons that bringing them together is important. First, a comparison with Duchamp can help throw some of the negative (critical) and positive (reconstructive) issues in the epistemology of the sociology of knowledge into relief: both launch a reflexive institutional critique of their objects (art and knowledge respectively) but then both 'rehabilitate' their objects with an anti-reification 1 'agenda' that suggests better, more dynamic understanding can be the result of loosening one's epistemological grip on concepts. Second, I believe that the sociology of knowledge has a unique relationship with social science and sociology as a whole with respect to institutions of truth-making. A dialog with Duchamp and the art world will help illuminate this relationship. And, third, in highlighting analogous forms in two disparate intellectual realms, my analysis suggests that it might be fruitful to look deeper into the intellectual structure of modernism or modernity as a whole, rather than studying the intellectual history and pattern of influences in one or two fields at a time, in order to uncover some of the underlying possibilities for modern thought more generally.
I begin this article with a lengthy description and discussion of the issues in Duchamp's work. Both those who are familiar with Duchamp's work and those who are less so may wonder why I spend as much time as I do with this section. Here I am trying to highlight the issues in Duchamp's work that have important epistemological implications. A detailed initial discussion will pay off by setting the stage for a much stronger and clearer comparison with the sociology of knowledge later. I begin by briefly contextualizing Duchamp's work in terms of its art-historical milieu and its abiding themes. I quickly move to a discussion of Duchamp's conception of 'objectivity' and its role in his work. The chief venue for his 'objective' conception of art-making is a series of works called the 'ready-mades'. These works are important to my discussion because in them Duchamp's critique of the 'epistemology' of the art world and art-making is particularly clear. These works are epistemological because their meaning forces reflexivity about art by making us question what art is; how we know works to be art; and how institutions contribute to the production, legitimation, and reception of art. Turning away from the ready-mades, I next explore a set of artworks through which Duchamp explored two of his most important themes: 'desire' and 'delay'. I interpret these works as portraying the relationship between the process of representation and the production of meaning, the themes of idealization and realization, and the dangers of reification.
After setting this foundation, I move to the sociology of knowledge to quickly chart its intellectual heritage. Then I turn to the issue of truth in this intellectual tradition and begin the long-delayed comparison with Duchamp. I trace the ways in which each forces reflexivity about knowledge and art respectively. They both critically challenge their objectstruth/knowledge and art -by setting them in relief against the contexts in which those objects are embedded. For each, the result is an institutional critique that courts self-refutation of its own methods. I finish the discussion of truth in the sociology of knowledge by examining Mannheim's notion of relationalism and argue its parallels with Duchamp's notions of desire, delay, representation and meaning.
In the final section of the article, I look at the concept of the avantgarde in order to understand further the parallels between Duchamp and the sociology of knowledge. I use Peter Bürger's work to understand the avant-garde as raising a critique of art as an institution. By mapping Bürger's discussion to the sociology of knowledge, I argue that it functions as a kind of avant-garde for social science more generally and trace the implications of this claim. I end with a suggestion and a couple of questions about what the striking parallels between Duchamp and the sociology of knowledge might suggest about modern culture and thought more generally. Finally, an appendix to the article addresses some questions of method and problems of reflexivity brought up by the curious nature of the comparison.
came to be amalgamated into a single, if layered, concept. This layering accounts for the hopelessly but interestingly confused present usage of the term objectivity, which can be applied to everything from empirical reliability to procedural correctness to emotional detachment. (1992: 82, italics in the original) In an analysis of scientific atlases from the 17th through the 20th century they traced the issue of 'mechanical' or 'noninterventionist' objectivity in scientists' accounts of how to provide proper visual representations of scientific phenomena. They show how objectivity has developed both negative and positive moments. The negative aspect of objectivity involves the repression of a researcher's subjective influence on the objects of research. Inappropriate involvement might include 'scientific and aesthetic judgements, dogmatic system building, and anthropomorphism . . . [even] theories and hypotheses which might distort the phenomena' (Daston and Galison, 1992: 82-3) . This negative aspect of objectivity depends on a positive one: the particular traits of the researcher and methods she uses to banish the subjective from research. These might include 'painstaking care and exactitude, infinite patience, unflagging perseverance, preternatural sensory acuity, and an insatiable appetite for work' (Daston and Galison, 1992: 83) . Daston and Galison argue that these negative and positive aspects of objectivity take on particular configurations over time. As we will see, Duchamp deployed a notion of objectivity in his art-making that mobilized particular negative and positive moments of his devising.
Duchamp's goal was to get away from retinal or aesthetic art and to do so he concentrated on images and objects that were impersonal or 'objective'. In the negative sense, Duchamp's objectivity was an effort to avoid the stamp of personal aesthetic taste. Beauty and aesthetics (the 'retinal') to Duchamp were mere habits of art and artists. Aesthetic judgments and taste form the realm in which artists have power and privilege. Duchamp believed that artists consigned themselves to a kind of mindlessness -habit if you will -by dwelling in this realm. His objectivity, then, was a means by which he could efface his aesthetic judgment and suppress his impulse toward habit. 5 In this effort Duchamp sometimes deployed the trope of 'shock' (by de-or re-facing the Mona Lisa, for example) similar to the Dadaists. But perhaps anticipating the way shock, too, could become a habit -in the process losing the quality of shock -Duchamp used it judiciously and explored ways of parlaying it into other related notions like irony (as when he reproduced his own works in the Box in Valise ) or 'scientific' indifference (as in Three Standard Stoppages discussed below). The positive moment of Duchamp's objectivity came in two conflicting methods of self-discipline. On the one hand, as I will describe below, he practiced a rigorous spontaneity in some of his works. On the other hand, for some works he worked extremely deliberately, slowly, and thoughtfully, taking a total of 28 years to make his two most complex works. These positive techniques of his objectivity were deployed in order to remove the mark of his personality and taste, thus pushing his art into a primarily cognitive, rather than aesthetic, realm.
Duchamp's ready-mades are the clearest examples of this 'objectivity' in action. A ready-made is an object (usually prefabricated) plucked from the world and with no, or minimal, alteration is named and signed as a piece of art. The ready-mades were not intended to show the beauty of the world of pre-fab objects, but to question the process, agent and products of art making (Goldsmith, 1983; Seigel, 1995: 115-47) . Among the most famous of the ready-mades are the previously mentioned L. H.O.O.Q.; Fountain (1917), the urinal; Bicycle Wheel (1913) , the stem and wheel of a bicycle attached to the seat of a stool; In Advance of the Broken Arm (1915), a snow shovel; and Bottle Rack (1914) . To cultivate 'objectivity' in the production of his ready-mades, Duchamp had to suppress his taste regarding the aesthetic, symbolic and conceptual qualities of the objects. To maximize the objectivity of his ready-made choices, Duchamp forced himself to adhere to a methodology that emphasized spontaneity. He decided not to allow himself to plan out ready-mades or pick them intentionally; however, at times Duchamp would commit himself to 'make' a ready-made at a particular moment in the future when his surroundings and the objects available to him would be unknown (Seigel, 1995: 116) . He also limited the number produced to avoid patterns in their choice, and occasionally he enlisted others in choosing or building them. In this vein, Seigel claims that:
. . . the readymades were a defense against personal fixity. Because the various objects did not look alike, had different visual qualities and features, [Duchamp] could 'produce' a series of them without repeating himself, without developing any defined personal style or taste; and taste, he declared, was merely a habit. (1995: 116) The end result he sought was a series of artworks which avoided the stamp of his personality and were 'visually indifferent' -a goal he was generally successful in, for while many of the objects are visually interesting, this interest fails to separate itself from their overall impact to become something purely, or even mainly, aesthetic. Duchamp did not eschew the visual per se, just its association with beauty and aesthetics; in fact, he was fascinated with the cognitive aspect of the visual. Despite his avoidance of personal aesthetic judgment or taste, there are limits to 'objectivity' in the ready-mades because many avoided visual aesthetic distinction but bore the mark of his other (personal) thematic concerns. It is important to realize that Duchamp's objectivity is a biting critique of the individual creator in art. Duchamp implicitly asserts that taste, choice and genius are mere habit and therefore rejects them as the defining characteristics of an artist. Some have interpreted this gesture as curtailing the freedom of the artist and have applied the artistic epithet of formalism to Duchamp's efforts (Goldsmith, 1983 ).
Duchamp's method of objectivity helped produce the ready-mades' confrontation with the institution of art: Duchamp' s readymades mounted their challenge from outside the recognized sphere of artistic practice; their novelty consisted precisely in breaching the boundary between art and non-art, relegating that distinction to the same fragile status of the 'merely conventional' to which earlier modernists had consigned classicism or realism. (Seigel, 1995: 115) 6 The ready-mades do this work through a number of steps. They bring everyday objects into the rarefied and exotic world of art through a double disruption. First, the object stripped from its context and placed in a gallery or other artistic context loses its original purpose or meaning. Fountain, for example, ceased to be a urinal when placed in a non-functional position in an art show. Second, the institutions of the gallery or museum are called into question -what does including a urinal in a show say about that gallery, the abilities of its decision makers, and the other artworks which surround it? 7 In addition, part of a ready-made's 'artistic' meaning depends on the meaning which followed its function in its everyday context. Bicycle Wheel disrupted the purposes of both its halves -sitting and riding -while upsetting the idea of movement itself by containing it forever in the futile spinning of the wheel. Similarly, Fountain works so well precisely because it is a urinal, with all the associations that entails, and at the same time has an elegant shape. 8 Finally, a few of the ready-mades and Duchamp's other works highlight the inadequacy of language to describe them through their playful, nonsensical names. In Advance of the Broken Arm, the snow shovel, is an example which frees name from referent and words from the requirement of making sense. Duchamp frequently used puns to similar effect (L.H.O.O.Q., for example) hoping to make the instability of meaning an abiding quality of the artistic object -a type of 'anti-fixity' for which he often strove. 9 In the end, Duchamp's ready-mades revel in contradiction and court refutation and rejection. Their effect, especially in concert, is so disruptive that it might draw the dismissive criticism of being what Clement Greenberg (1975) , the critical champion of abstract expressionism, called 'avantgardism' or shock as a posture for its own sake. 10 I will now highlight three conceptual consequences of the readymades: forced contextualization, an injunction to reflexivity and a critique of authority. First, Duchamp's ready-mades immediately bring the context which surrounds them into the foreground. Part of their impact is their capacity to alienate themselves, their physical and epistemic environments, and their viewers without recourse to vulgar tactics. Few paintings -and probably none before Duchamp -have ever made the walls they hang upon or the idea of making art seem strange. 11 Duchamp's art was also some of the first to be opaque to the unschooled viewer (i.e. lacking the relevant context). It forces new relationships to emerge from its context, derives its meaning from that context (rather than formal tradition or content recognition), and makes that context (as well as the broader tradition) seem strange and arbitrary. In so doing, it pushes us to recognize that all art derives meaning from context. Second, and closely related, is the fact that , comments on this phenomenon directly. Duchamp created it by dropping 1 meter-long strings onto canvas from 1 meter above, then gluing them in place. The result was a symbolic system that integrated the effects of chance for 'measuring' the hermetic artistic world he created. But it also suggested an infinite number of other (equally valid) systems of measurement and judgment waiting to be deployed (Seigel, 1995: 165) .
These moves result both in a challenge to and a restoration of elitism: on the one hand, Duchamp's art problematizes the legitimacy and authority of old-guard art institutions and their ability to create standards and distinctions for art, but, on the other, it results in the production of artwork which is so rarefied and intellectual that anyone not an expert has difficulty understanding it. These dilemmas have challenged the institutions of art ever since. 12 It is important to note, however, that the 'legitimation crisis' in art, while a difficult situation, has been far from fully negative. Philosopher Arthur Danto has analyzed this situation with his 'end of art' thesis. He claims that art since the 1960s (Duchamp's legacy) has broken completely with the formal concerns that had defined art-making for hundreds of years. While this situation has created an unstable terrain for art and artists, it would only be read as wholly negative by cultural conservatives and the sentimental. 13 On the contrary, art has been given wide territory to explore and integrate into its repertoire. It must be admitted, however, that while the amount of 'bad art' produced after Duchamp may be no greater proportionately than at any other time in history, Duchamp has also created new ways for artists to fail -that is, cognitively as well as, or instead of, aesthetically.
The final aspects of Duchamp's work that I would like to highlight before moving to the sociology of knowledge are the themes of delay and representation. These themes, prevalent throughout Duchamp's oeuvre, are exemplified best by his two most elaborate works: The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (1915-23) , also known as The Large Glass, and Given: 1. The Waterfall 2. The Illuminating Gas (1946-66) . These two artworks are among Western art's most complicated, and it will be difficult for me to do them justice in this short space. The Large Glass is a painting on glass which diagrams a moment of mutual fantasy and seduction between a 'bride' and nine 'bachelors'. Through a complicated set of mechanisms and mutual exchanges, the bride and her bachelors find themselves in a state of permanent desire, exchange without possession, furious motion without movement, a perpetual becoming or blossoming. As the work's clinching gesture, Duchamp left it 'permanently unfinished' in 1923. The first point I would like to make is that The Large Glass highlights the irreconcilability of representation between two groups whose relationship is mutually determining but not antagonistic. Seigel (1995) interprets the bride and bachelors, in part, as projections of each other's fantasies and desires -their representation is structured by the action of mutual desire and distance which constitutes their relationship (Seigel, 1995: 91-2) . These representations of fantasy are determined by a structural relationship, but simply because the structure does not reflect the idiosyncrasy desire or the agency of the bride or bachelors does not mean that it is an unfaithful representation. The structured fact of this representation is neither simply oppressive nor liberating but inescapable. This point will become clearer in the article's next section.
My second point concerns delay of meaning in The Large Glass. One of the most important sources of information about The Large Glass is Duchamp's Green Box (1934) , an artwork in edition which contains notes on scraps of paper to be used 'like a mail-order catalog' when looking at the former work. 14 But these notes are populated with nonsense, contradictions, puns, jokes and self-referential, fantastic descriptions. Seigel describes The Large Glass as a representation of delay of meaning:
The various forms of irony with which the project was surrounded, keeping the meaning promised by the title, the symbolism, and the notes just beyond the grasp of us the viewers, was [sic] another form of delay, making the picture itself an icon of permanently forestalled communication. . . . [It is] a hoard of ideas, gathered up and preserved against despoliation. (1995: 97) It is important to see not only that the meaning of the Large Glass fails to arrive, but also that its meaning, and the meaning of the desire it depicts, is in part the delay of meaning.
My final point here concerns the contrast between idealization and realization in representation as exemplified by the comparison between The Large Glass and Given (Duchamp's final work displayed only posthumously).
Whereas the former work is about the ephemeral, unsettled quality of desire as an ideal representation, Given is a odd and jarring representation of desire realized, made concrete (Seigel, 1995: 104-14) . It is a diorama that the viewer approaches by peeking through holes in a large wooden door. Behind the door is an opening in a brick wall, and beyond that lies a realistic landscape in which a nude woman is splayed on a bed of sticks with her head out of view and legs spread -a victim, perhaps, of some sexual violence. She holds a gas lantern and a moving illusion of a waterfall turns in the distance. As is his tendency, Duchamp employs techniques of distancing the viewer from the work -physically constraining one's view, providing and withholding information, presenting a work which is compelling in its uniqueness but perturbing because it lacks any explanation. Still, even with these distancing techniques, it is impossible not to feel complicity in the woman's violation; Duchamp enlists the viewer's participation. The viewer's gaze contributes by penetrating the scene, but neither the scene nor its context provide enough information to make sense of, let alone rectify, the situation and aid the woman. But does she even need help? Is the scene to be read as violent or is it the strange, quiet aftermath of a summer tryst in the woods?
Part of what Duchamp is doing with The Large Glass and Given is contrasting the difference between the mirthful, frustrating, contradictory depiction of desire as an ideal and its titillating, yet arbitrary, confusing and troubling realization. Moving away from the consideration of desire to representation more generally, this pair of works reflects the difficulties, compromises, and gains and losses in trying to move from ideal to real, general to particular, theory to practice. This is the problem, also, of reification, of grasping too tightly on to one's representation. It is clear, Seigel (1995) argues, which moment Duchamp prefers, even as he realizes the necessity of both, if only for contrast. The (reified) world of the concrete and specific is arbitrary and confusing; limits to understanding abound, perhaps even more painfully than on an ideal plane. But it is also important to realize that there is much to be gained from the presence of both. In addition to being depictions of different moments of desire, the contrast between the two works (worlds) contributes to the meanings of both, for, like the bride and the bachelors in The Large Glass, their meanings are structurally interrelated.
Given: 1. The Sociology of Knowledge 2. Duchamp 3. The Illuminating Gas As I turn now to the sociology of knowledge and how Duchamp can illuminate some of its epistemological issues, let me take a moment to describe some of its intellectual origins and trajectories. The sociology of knowledge has drawn from major intellectual founders of sociology generally: it is indebted to the Weberian tradition of interpretive sociology, Durkheim's investigations into primitive classification and social structure, established a basis for the social-scientific study of ideas, and Marx's materialism which holds that social life determines consciousness. Other important influences include Nietzsche's ressentiment and his sense of the cultural power of ideas, the non-teleological evolutionism of Darwin, the historicism of Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Scheler's claims about sociohistorical factors influencing the appearance of ideas (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 7; Kaufmann, 1944: 183) . Emerging from these social theoretical foundations are a number of quasi-autonomous movements.
First is the 'classical' tradition whose most important representative is Karl Mannheim. Mannheim integrated Scheler's ideas with Marx's to claim not only that both the presence and the content of ideas (excepting perhaps abstract science and math) are determined by social factors, but also that they are structured by social relations into opposing 'camps' (Mannheim, 1936) . Some ideas bolster the social order and are therefore ideological, and others challenge it and are therefore utopian. Mannheim was trying to transcend Marxian claims about the 'universality' of proletarian knowledge by making a general statement about how ideas, social structure and power intersect regardless of a society's particular economic or political organization. Mannheim and the more Marxist Frankfurt School developed their ideas roughly at the same time as and in opposition to each other. Horkheimer and Adorno (1994) , their colleagues and students (most notably Habermas) sought in part to understand the particular character of knowledge and its production in capitalist society. Following Lukács (1971) , but also Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, they emphasized the always historical character of validity claims for knowledge and the inextricability of knowledge and science from the domination of nature and perhaps humanity. The Frankfurt School was highly critical of efforts like Mannheim's (discussed further below) to posit the privilege of a knowing subject who is ungrounded in a social setting.
Norbert Elias, a student and colleague of Mannheim's, emphasized the context of a society's long-term development for the potential that it has to generate different forms of knowledge. This is an element that Mannheim (1952) hints at, but fails to develop fully, in his discussions of the connection between the sociology of knowledge and a 'broader' sociology of culture. Elias's Involvement and Detachment (1987) demonstrates that the different possibilities for the kind of 'indifference' necessary to promote the 'scientification' of knowledge in a society are dependent on the particular forms of the interconnection between psychological dispositions and the cultural commitments of that society. He claims that any theory of the development and validity of scientific knowledge must show how it evolves out of nonscientific knowledge through a set of dynamics (including cultural double binds and a society's evolving capacities to control nature, social order, and individuals). 15 Unfortunately, Elias's unique insights about studying knowledge in terms of long-term processes of social and cultural development have not yet been much followed in the sociology of knowledge and science.
Another important set of traditions has roots in phenomenology. Alfred Schutz (1962 Schutz ( , 1967 attempted to provide a phenomenological ground to the understanding of intersubjectivity in social life and the creation of meanings. Berger and Luckmann's (1966) synthetic work generalized the phenomenological view to theorize all of reality, insofar as it is apprehended by humans, as a social construction, that is a projection of human meanings.
It thus expands what counts as knowledge (at least sociologically) far beyond the lofty canons of philosophy, the arts and humanities, and the sciences. Garfinkel's (1967) ethnomethodology combines phenomenology with pragmatism to study the development and contours of what might be described as people's 'vernacular epistemologies and ontologies'. These branches of the sociology of knowledge emphasize the ways symbol-wielding actors interact to create structures of meaning in everyday life.
Another tradition in the sociology of knowledge turned to the study of scientific knowledge following Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) which put forth some of the most serious arguments for the influence of 'non-rational' social factors on both the context in which scientific facts are discovered and the means by which scientists justify their claims. The Edinburgh School's 'strong programme', often known as the sociology of scientific knowledge, has participated in this project (combining ideas from Kuhn, Durkheim and Wittgenstein among others) by arguing that prior efforts in the sociology of knowledge had implicitly been sociologies of errors. 16 Its practitioners call for social accounts of the emergence of ideas we believe to be true, including those of mathematics and the natural sciences. This group (active since the 1970s) has played an agitator's part in some academic circles by actively embracing the relativism which most of the tradition's German originators tried hard to avoid.
There are other traditions in the sociology of knowledge as well. Feminist theorists have developed sociology of knowledge insights that focus on the gendered content of theories and exclusionary institutional practices (Harding, 1986 (Harding, , 1991 Smith, 1987 Smith, , 1990 . And French 'poststructuralists' like Foucault (1970 Foucault ( , 1973 and Bourdieu (1975 Bourdieu ( , 1990 have generated sociologies of knowledge by emphasizing, for example, how knowledge production accompanies and pushes social and political change, how new institutions of (scientific) knowledge were wrapped up in the historical conditions leading to the transition to modernity, and how conflict between social groups is always also an effort by each to impose its version of reality on the social setting. This brief review of the sociology of knowledge could be expanded to include other important participants.
This article is not the place for a comprehensive review of the continuities and tensions within the traditions I have designated as the sociology of knowledge. Indeed, some readers might object that I have created a category that is not in the end coherent. Risking this possibility I propose that a number of common themes unify this set of traditions and justify my use of the 'sociology of knowledge' as 'one thing' throughout the article. All branches of the sociology of knowledge emphasize the historical and institutional groundedness of knowledge. This means that the criteria for judging knowledge and the conditions for creating it developed historically and are in some way dependent on particular contexts for validity. However, within the tradition there is great diversity of opinion regarding how strongly to emphasize the context dependence of knowledge and how to deal with the 'anti-realist' and 'relativist' implications this concept conjures up. In addition, all branches of the sociology of knowledge see knowledge in its genesis and deployment as entangled with interests and power. All seem to agree that knowledge also serves institutional functions (such as gatekeeping and legitimation) that are ostensibly external to, but can have an effect on, its content. The sociology of knowledge is always critical to some degree in that it unmasks hidden functions of knowledge, revises accepted views of what knowledge is or how it is generated, points to how its content or form could be different than it is, and so forth. 17 Finally, all traditions of the sociology of knowledge conjure the specter of epistemological relativism but deal with it in different ways. There may be other themes that unify what I am calling the sociology of knowledge, or one of the themes I identify arguably might not be equally relevant to all, but this list should provide a passable working definition.
In this discussion ethnomethodology, the Edinburgh School, and especially Mannheim are the chief examples I draw upon to illustrate the sociology of knowledge and compare it to Duchamp. Some close version of each of the arguments below should apply to each of the 'members' of the sociology of knowledge I just introduced, but when the argument is more narrow and applicable to a subset of the tradition, I try to indicate that. Despite the difficulties of doing so, I want to preserve the category of 'the sociology of knowledge' even though I often use particular examples because I want to make the comparison to the tradition as a whole. I will turn now to a more detailed discussion of truth as an issue in the sociology of knowledge through a comparison with Duchamp's own relationship to art and representation. The tradition's relationship to truth entails themes that are both practical (how should we approach it and study it?) and epistemological (should we believe in it or what should our stance towards it be?). To get at these intertwining themes I will begin by discussing how the sociology of knowledge is a contextualizing tradition, move to its methodological issues and assumptions, and finally arrive at its deferred notion of truth.
Most traditions in the sociology of knowledge and Duchamp promote a radical project of contextualization through their works. One of the most important effects of Duchamp's work, especially his ready-mades, was to render a once-transparent context opaque and visible. The ready-mades were works whose content highlighted the power of art as a system of physical and ideological institutions. They also bring worlds (of high and low, refinement and everyday) together and show the distinction to be both conventional and functional. Sociological studies contextualize knowledge in much the same way. If their findings are taken seriously, it becomes impossible to understand knowledge as developing solely according to the logical dictates of its own hermetic world as an 'internalist' understanding of their history might hold (Porter, 1990 ). Instead we must understand a two-way permeability between a world of ideas and the social world in which it arises. Without reducing one world to the other (in most cases), the central task in a sociological study of knowledge is to bring the complicated interdependence of ideas and context to the forefront of analysis. Within the sociology of knowledge, social studies of science have generated the most controversial claims about the context dependence of knowledge because the authority of the sciences is founded on postulates of the context independence of their findings, methods and theories.
Just as the sociology of knowledge produces a new image of knowledge as a socially generated set of representations saturated with social interests, Duchamp helped create a new idea of art as a philosophical tool which could draw from the broad world of everyday objects to build its meanings. In short, both the traditions of the sociology of knowledge and Duchamp's work are substantially about analyzing contexts and problematizing comfortable distinctions. In so being, they also mandate a reflexive attitude by their practitioners. Neither Duchamp nor most practitioners of the sociology of knowledge completely deny the validity of the worlds with which they are concerned (art and science/knowledge/truth, respectively), but they do make those worlds problematic and difficult to navigate in the way we are accustomed. After Duchamp and the sociology of knowledge and science, artists and researchers have to be cognizant of the content, form, and justification of their artistic and (scientific) knowledge statements. Thus the contextualizing activities of these discourses have epistemological and methodological consequences. Using the example of Mannheim, let me consider in more detail the ways the sociology of knowledge enacts this contextualization with its attendant epistemological shake-ups.
Like any scientist, the sociologist of knowledge must approach her research question with an attitude of 'objectivity' -deploying tools of selfrestraint to remove her own subjective attachments from her methods and findings. 18 This is no simple matter when studying the truth claims of others, or, put differently, when analyzing the conditions and expressions of their 'objectivity'. One might claim, as did Marx, that manifestations of knowledge in a social milieu are determined by one's position vis-a-vis various ideological apparatuses, but beneath it all laws of history independent of those who would apprehend them await the proper agents to express them. Mannheim ' " radicalizes" the ideology concept' (Kaufmann, 1944: 184) by denying trans-historical objectivity. He says we must study the social effects on and of knowledge to assess its ideological and utopian (i.e. oppositional) functionings. The social scientist is not to spend her time adjudicating between knowledge claims but instead takes an attitude of indifference toward their truth-value. The task is to understand how some ideas emerge from the social order in support of it (playing a stabilizing, ideological function) and others in opposition to it (calling for change toward a utopian ideal). 19 Mannheim hopes the sociologist of knowledge, by adopting a kind of attitude of indifference, can be a 'free-floating intellectual' who provides a true account of the social functioning of ideas and groups without having any interest or claim about their respective truth or righteousness. As Kaufmann (1944: 186) notes '[o]nly a social group that is not deeply rooted in tradition . . . will be able to perform such a synthesis'. Mannheim's goal is to preserve objectivity for the researcher by forbidding her from becoming a mouthpiece for ideological or utopian forces. Thus the free-floating intellectual's objective account undermines the claims of objectivity and truth for others. 20 The question begged, of course, is: why should we believe the freefloating intellectual? Are her ideas not determined by her social position as well? Mannheim has a historical and a pragmatic response to this implicit charge of relativism. In the first, he claims that the relativism criticism is a sociohistorical product of the insights he and others made about contextualism that did not exist before. The crux of this criticism is the confusion of the truth-value of different kinds of knowledge claims:
The older type of thought, which regarded such examples [e.g. analytic statements like 2 ϫ 2 = 4] as the model of all thought, was necessarily led to the rejection of all those forms of knowledge which were dependent upon the subjective stand point and the social situation of the knower and which were hence, merely 'relative'. (Mannheim, 1936: 70) According to Mannheim, it is a mistake to extend the standards of the kind of truth which characterize disciplines such as mathematics and logic to all types of inquiry. 21 Second, acknowledging the social situatedness of scientific actors, he asks, 'which social standpoint vis-à-vis of [sic] history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth?' (Mannheim, 1936: 71) . He searches not for an absolute but for an optimal, temporally specific truth. This requires a researcher who can free herself from making value-judgments and who can represent all perspectives on an issue with an eye to 'the narrowness of each individual point of view and the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total social process' (Mannheim, 1936: 72) . Thus Mannheim claims a difficult and problematic notion of truth based on social context and relations. 'Relationalism', as he called it, becomes a continuum of truth whose ends are not anchored in any kind of absolute but that labors under the ideal of accurate, democratic and non-judgmental representation of differing claims and perspectives (Mannheim, 1936: 67-74) .
As may already be clear, strong parallels can be drawn between the functioning and consequences of 'objectivity' in the work of Mannheim and Duchamp. Here it should be noted that Mannheim exemplifies characteristics widely manifested in the sociology of knowledge. First, both deploy an air of indifference to negotiate the touchy situations they opened up. This attitude serves as a kind of insulation against the radical implications of their critical positions. For example, it was easier to corral and reject the implications of the Dadaists' passionate iconoclasm than Duchamp's more subtle variety. Mannheim sought to protect the sociology of knowledge from the attacks of ideologues of all colors and to shore up its complex hold on truth-making by saying it would refuse to take sides in its accounts. This strategy is a kind of criticism through the back door, a type of immanent critique: it problematizes the ways certain categories (namely, art and truth) are conceived without having to establish norms for comparison. In both cases, while claiming indifference and dispassion, this kind of criticism has a sharp edge to it. Like money and power, the ability to make truth and define categories (whether in art, politics, science or elsewhere) is not distributed evenly in our society. Therefore, even a guarded attack on this ability is likely to have a greater effect on social, institutional, or epistemological elites than others. 22 This subtle, but effective, attack on authority undermines institutional standards of judgment just as Duchamp's ready-mades do. Not only does a sociological understanding contextualize and demystify the processes by which knowledge claims are generated and legitimated, it also highlights their exclusionary, gate-keeping functions. By laying bare these processes, the sociology of knowledge problematizes them and, at least potentially, makes the drawing of future boundaries (i.e. deciding what contents do and do not belong inside the institution) more difficult. A second implication here is that the knowledge produced by ideologues and utopians is mutually, reciprocally structured by competing interests rather than through any metaphysically privileged claim to Truth or Reality. This understanding of the ontological interdependence of two (opposed) parties is analogous to the depiction of the bride and bachelors' desire captured by Duchamp in The Large Glass. In this sense, the free-floating intellectual is the same as Duchamp, stepping outside the situation to capture the (dynamic) relationship of its protagonists.
Implicit in the sociological contextualization of knowledge is the idea that there may be many other venues for the production of knowledge apart from canonical institutions such as art, science and religion. If truth is derived through institutional practices and its justification rationalized through appeal to tradition (even if this tradition has a long and venerable epistemological pedigree), then the sociologist of knowledge might seek other venues of knowledge production in marginal institutions or outside of institutions altogether. Ethnomethodology is just such a pursuit (though not everyone would view it as central to the sociology of knowledge tradition). It builds upon Schutzian investigations of intersubjectivity to show how people build elaborate knowledge structures complete with theories and methods for such banal activities as sitting on a jury, giving and receiving directions, and having a gender. 23 The implication here is not that these methods and epistemologies of the everyday directly challenge institutionalized forms of knowledge but that every person as a functional member of society is an accomplished methodologist and epistemologistthat the everyday world, though undocumented and less deliberately constructed, is potentially as complicated as the laboratory.
This emphasis on the richness of the everyday is also found in Duchamp's ready-mades. Many contemporary defenses of Fountain, the urinal, focused on its elegant aesthetic qualities. 24 Similarly, Duchamp claimed he derived much more visual satisfaction from the spinning Bicycle Wheel than he would have from the most sensuous Matisse (Tomkins, 1996: 133-5) . 25 Still, none of this refers seriously to the aesthetic tradition of high art, and as I discussed earlier, simple aesthetics are not the thrust of the ready-mades which had many more critical functions -functions which are not necessarily shared by ethnomethodology. However, a related tradition of anthropological ethnographies of laboratories has brought the everyday into the laboratory, by treating scientists as 'regular people' or even 'members of an unknown tribe'. 26 These studies have not had the kind of influence on science that Duchamp's ready-mades have had on art. Duchamp, after all, is practicing art while anthropologists and sociologists of knowledge are not practicing (natural) science in a comparable way. This lack of influence might also be attributed to the epistemological inertia of science and the material implications that might obtain were the ideas accepted. Despite the fact that no variety of the sociology of knowledge has had much influence on science or its public reception, the disruptive tendencies of its contextualizing project have contributed to much controversy in the academy (the ongoing 'Science Wars' are the latest instance). The sociology of knowledge and Duchamp perform another set of critical functions by problematizing the stability of distinctions and distinction-making in their respective objects. Schutz (1962 Schutz ( , 1967 , refining Weber (1968) , described what differentiates the social sciences from the natural sciences as the fact that social scientists encounter a pre-interpreted world and must base their interpretations on the understandings and meanings brought to bear by the human subjects of study. Kaufmann (1944) , arguing that this situation formed the crucial distinction between natural and social science, defined it as follows: natural scientists work in a world of first-order constructs in which they are able to name the objects they study (discover, construct). These names are created by the scientist wielding particular theories and methods. Social scientists, in contrast, encounter a world populated not by mute biochemical effects or subatomic particles but by symbolusing actors who understand social categories, actions and structures based on their own learned common-sense perceptions. The constructs of social scientists are therefore of a second order since they are based on the categories used by the subjects they study. 27 Some concepts and categories straddle the line between the first-and second orders. Duster (1996) describes race as just such a category. While most scientists have discarded race as a concept worthy of biological study in itself, its second-order nature is alive and well and, importantly, depends in part on race's long, complex 'first-order' history. 28 Duster's study highlights the recalcitrance of some concepts that refuse to settle in either firstor second-order worlds. The task of a sociological account of knowledge, in a case like this, is to study and recount the complicated workings and consequences of the social dialectic between the first-and second-order constructs of the concept. One function of the first-order/second-order distinction is to separate epistemological spaces for natural and social scientific research. A more extreme proponent of the sociology of knowledge, an adherent of the 'strong programme', for example, might argue that this distinction serves to buffer the natural sciences from critical scrutiny and that first-order concepts should be equally accessible to social science. This argument would hold that, as social actors, scientists bring their social conceptual milieus to bear on first-order objects no matter how great a scientific apparatus is erected to weed out the common sense.
If we extend Kaufmann's distinction to the appropriate context, we can see that Duchamp is doing something very similar to the sociology of knowledge. We can translate the distinction by replacing Kaufmann's 'concept' with 'art object'. A first-order art object would be one that is created by the artist to represent a particular theme in accordance with some community holding aesthetic standards. Little of the first-order art object's meaning inheres in its object-hood -we do not value paintings because they are composed of pigments and oil on canvas or sculptures because they are lumps of marble. Duchamp's ready-mades are a different story. They come 'pre-interpreted' from the world of everyday objects, but they have ceased to be merely those objects. Just as second-order concepts in social science harness the meanings of common sense in their own meanings, so too do ready-mades. In Advance of the Broken Arm is a snow shovel that is not a snow shovel any more because it has been named and labeled an art object. The ready-mades can be seen as doing something very similar to what sociologists of knowledge such as Duster (1996) do in their studies. 29 Both motivate and problematize the distinction between first and second orders as important components of their content.
There are also similarities between Mannheim's discussion of the task of the sociologist of knowledge and the conception of delay found in Duchamp's works such as The Large Glass and Given. Recall that these works together depicted and used the theme of delay to represent the functioning of desire. Mannheim, too, expresses that same ambiguous problematic in his discussion of the assessment of the analysis of ideology. To begin with, in section five of his second chapter (1936: 67-74), Mannheim denounces the claim that contextualizing knowledge leads to relativism as old-fashioned, arguing instead for a relational understanding of knowledge and a method for studying it. But, he cautions us, we are not to evaluate the knowledge we study in terms of its truth use, or moral value (1936: 72-8) . In section six (1936: 74-8) Mannheim revels in the epistemological advantage bestowed by change and uncertainty. The researcher will:
. . . direct his attention to discovering the approximate truth as it emerges in the course of historical development out of the complex social process. . . . It is precisely our uncertainty which brings us a good deal closer to reality than was possible in former periods which had faith in the absolute.
It is now quite clear that only in a rapidly and profoundly changing intellectual world could ideas and values, formerly regarded as fixed, have been subjected to a thoroughgoing criticism. (Mannheim, 1936: 75) Soon, though, in section seven (1936: 78-80), Mannheim worries that he has reified his methodological technique of relationalism. He fears for a moment he has created an implicit normative foundation that advances de facto evaluative claims. But then he's off again, claiming that his metaphysics would only be considered a problem by a positivist who adopts a radical anti-metaphysical stance. Meanwhile, he firmly acknowledges his metaphysics for fear of being accused of having one later (1936: 80). Mannheim goes on like this for the next 15 pages, bouncing between the Scylla of metaphysical and ontological certainty and the Charybdis of evaluative relativism.
I do not want to criticize Mannheim for failing to adhere to certain standards of logical coherence because I feel he navigates these difficult waters skillfully in trying to create an evaluative method that is, in the final instance, ungrounded. 30 In his explanation of relationalism and its consequences, Mannheim writes like he is holding a hot potato but has nowhere satisfying to set it down; additional explanation and qualification are the only way he can keep truth under control (and keep from burning his fingers). Mannheim believes that we can know things to be true as they relate to other things in a specific context. But because of philosophical problems and the historical failure of such projects he is unwilling to anchor the matrix of relational truth to anything more permanent. The way Mannheim chooses to deal with the reflexive problem of grounding his own truth claims is not one that is necessarily shared by other branches of the sociology of knowledge. However, it is important to realize that, while different theorists have different strategies for dealing with the problem, they all face some version of it. Thus Mannheim's particular effort is emblematic of the general problem for the sociology of knowledge.
Mannheim's account here is a remarkable performance of the delay in ultimate truth that his theory enacts and that Duchamp thematized in his own artwork. Mannheim's method, like so many of Duchamp's works, embodies permanent departure, motion without movement, disassembly without destruction, interpretation without certainty of meaning, perhaps even desire without consummation. Mannheim's analysis pushes us to understand that absolute truth is a red herring, an elusive goal, an epistemological misunderstanding, something whose nature changes the minute we think we have a hold on it. Truth, he demonstrates, is only available in a provisional, perspectival form whose ultimate status we defer. 31 Desire for Duchamp is much the same thing. We can think about truth or desire, act on them, describe how they work in certain times and places, but once we try to crystallize them, 32 their crass partiality and sudden distastefulness (recall the transition from The Large Glass to Given) become clear.
Finally, beyond Mannheim, much of the sociology of knowledge adopts a stance on truth which is much like Duchamp's 'anti-retinal' attitude to art. Duchamp was reacting against the cults of beauty and of the eye in art. He felt that reliance on the purely aesthetic dimension of the visual denied the deeper possibilities of art as a territory for the free play of ideas. The visual, much like knowledge in the hands of ideologues, functions to maintain tradition and quash more revolutionary directions. But even in enacting this critique he had to use the language of visual appeal as its medium (even though it was partially as ironic appropriation). So too with the sociology of knowledge. To argue against the trans-historical, cross-contextual stability of truth, it has to adopt the methods and language of truth. There is no outside of truth-telling, even if the truth told is why Truth flees before us. In this section I have tried to argue, through exemplary cases, that the sociology of knowledge and Duchamp adopt similar attitudes to their objects of concern, are dealing in much of the same epistemological currency and arrive at similar critical conclusions. In this article's final section I would like to take the comparison one step further to argue for a way to understand the role of the sociology of knowledge with respect to the rest of sociology.
In Advance of the Broken . . . Sociology of Knowledge and the Avant-garde
The avant-garde is commonly thought of as a set of artistic movements (including music, dance, literature, etc.) from the early part of this century which vehemently opposed bourgeois society, sought a break with traditional values and aligned themselves with radical politics. These movements prized newness and dissolution in their art and usually adopted provocative or shocking stances towards their audiences. Regardless of the lasting effect of the avant-garde, it has stirred up much debate and criticism. Statements have run the gamut from praising these movements as the revolutionary vanguard of a new aesthetic/political order to criticizing them as the apotheosis of the bourgeoisie's decadence (Hughes, 1991: 57-111, 372-7) . Peter Bürger (1984) , in his detailed analysis of the European avantgarde from the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and the historical and critical efforts to understand them, argues that these typical perspectives obscure and romanticize the situation. 33 For example, the celebration of newness and breaks with tradition should not be the standard of understanding the avant-garde because these moments were so easily co-opted and absorbed by art institutions. Bürger (1984: 49) says instead that:
[t]he European avant-garde movements can be defined as an attack on the status of art in bourgeois society. What is negated is not an earlier form of art (a style) but art as an institution that is not associated with the praxis of men. There are two keys, then, for Bürger: that the avant-garde fundamentally seeks to show art to be a worldly, practical activity and that it seeks to insert art into the practical world outside art institutions. Bürger engages a complicated literature on aesthetic theory to make this case, but his discussion of this critical function of the avant-garde will help me argue that the sociology of knowledge can be understood as an avant-garde for social science at large.
The avant-garde mounts its challenge to art as it has been institutionalized, but does not seek to destroy art per se. Bürger (1984: 35-49) provides a schematic history of how bourgeois art became institutionalized as autonomous in the spheres of function, production and reception that the avant-garde had to attack. Where earlier forms of art served determinate social purposes, bourgeois art had, from the avant-garde's point of view, become useless in its 'aestheticism'. It became a depiction of bourgeois life and values but served no functional, didactic or practical purpose. The avant-garde, rather than reinvigorating a practical aspect of art, sought to 'sublate', in the Hegelian sense, art into the practice of life, thus making the distinction between art and life untenable: '[w]hen art and the praxis of life are one, when the praxis is aesthetic and art is practical, art's purpose can no longer be discovered' (Bürger, 1984: 51) . The ideal of production challenged by the avant-garde is the bourgeois conception of art as the work of an (ingenious, inspired) individual. The avant-garde did not do this by working collectively, but by working randomly, automatically or subconsciously (as in the case of the Dadaists or Surrealists), or, as I demonstrated with Duchamp, by working 'objectively'. These gestures mocked the idea of individual creativity, and, in the case of Duchamp who signed massproduced items, they showed the fetishization of the artist's signature by the art market. 34 The critique of artistic production flows into the avant-garde's assault on the ideal of art reception. Bürger shows that the avant-garde tried to remove the distinction between artist and audience by making much of their art into practical guides and recipes which anyone could follow. 35 He notes that 'such production is not to be understood as artistic production, but as part of a liberating life praxis' (Bürger, 1984: 53) . Thus avant-garde art made the artist and audience identical (at least in principle), but risked the art becoming an entirely personal, solipsistic endeavor.
The sociology of knowledge as a tradition within sociology begins to function like an avant-garde according to Bürger's criteria here by challenging the autonomy of knowledge as an institution. First, it calls into question the 'intended purpose' of knowledge. We must be careful here because a technological conception of knowledge -that people develop knowledge better to control their environments -does not fit the model. Instead I am referring to what might be called an 'aesthetic' conception of the development of knowledge. This is the widely held understanding of knowledge, best exemplified by abstract math and science, as value-free and without function until some clever person brings it down to the level of technology. It is analogous to Bürger's depiction of aestheticized, functionless bourgeois art (until some enterprising ad-exec turns it into a bill-board). The sociology of knowledge functions like an avant-garde by making the pure-and-neutral view of knowledge untenable. Where the avant-garde disqualified the question of a purpose for art by unifying art and practice, the sociology of knowledge has made inquiring into the function of knowledge and checking the interests behind it a requirement for understanding knowledge.
Second, the sociology of knowledge attacks the realm of knowledge production by calling epistemological privilege into question. Much like the avant-garde's attack on genius, most branches of the sociology of knowledge do not accept the premise that actors produce knowledge because they have some special relationship to truth. Rather than testing its legitimacy or lauding its productivity, the sociology of knowledge seeks to understand the formal and social effects of epistemological privilege of a knowledge system. Also, the sociology of knowledge contributes to an understanding of the ideological function of epistemology as a concept by showing how an epistemological system can obscure the complicated social context of knowledge production and how it can affect the structure of power within a set of social relations in which knowledge is being produced.
Third, the sociology of knowledge functions like an avant-garde by challenging the notion of individual reception of knowledge. Unlike Bürger's avant-garde, this attack does not occur through the existence of 'cookbooks' for knowledge. Instead it is mounted in two ways: first, through the problematization of the model that knowledge flows one-way out of the institutions in which it is produced, and second, through examples -such as ethnomethodological accounts -of the wealth of sophisticated knowledge production occurring in the everyday world of praxis. This third avantgardist function of the sociology of knowledge can suffer from the same criticism of solipsism as did the Surrealists or Dadaists, for example. If complicated vernacular epistemologies exist all around us without our being aware of them, what, really, do we gain by studying them?
Bürger argues that the European avant-garde was unsuccessful in its quest to unify art with the practice of life. 36 The institutions of art proved (not surprisingly) resilient enough to deflect and absorb their critical program. Although that moment has been relegated to history, the legacy of the avant-garde has been to revolutionize the structure, possibilities and limits of the work of art itself. Bürger discusses five major changes to the artwork: the institutionalization of the avant-garde as its sometime content, the imperative of newness at the same time as the elimination of 'advancement' as a category, the admission of chance, self-conscious artificiality, and the incorporation of montage as a technique (1984: 55-82) . It is at this point that the parallels with the sociology of knowledge falter. Much as the avantgarde has changed the concept of the artwork, sociological studies have changed our understanding of the concept of knowledge, but the two concepts have developed in different institutional contexts. There are some parallels between the concept of knowledge in the sociology of knowledge and the changes Bürger discusses -the functions of chance and newness seem likely candidates -but the concepts are different in other ways. The concept of art is bounded more specifically than that of knowledge; there are more venues and parties vying to define the latter so it is not surprising that one cannot be mapped perfectly to the other.
More specifically, the differences between the avant-garde possibilities of art and the sociology of knowledge have to do with the (dialectical) politics of knowledge -the way avant-garde critiques of institutions and authority themselves become established in authoritative institutions. Credible attacks on institutions such as art or science, for the most part, can only be launched by consecrated members of those institutions in the particular language of those institutions. In addition, those critiques become part of the content of the institution and tend to rarefy its concerns and solidify its boundaries rather than dissolve them and dissipate its concerns into the wider world. This, in part, explains why 'cross-disciplinary' critical efforts such as the sociology of knowledge are nearly doomed to a certain amount of failure -if success is measured as a cross-disciplinary, that is cross-institutional, effect. The sociology of knowledge, as I will argue below, can function as an avant-garde for sociology and epistemologically related disciplines, but it faces overwhelming barriers to affecting the non-sociological institutions it critically targets. In this way the 'failure' of the sociology of knowledge is quite analogous to that of Bürger's avant-garde in that neither has much ability to 'revolutionize' life beyond its own institutional boundaries, but each can shake things up within.
In what ways, then, does the sociology of knowledge play the avantgarde role within sociology? What have been the results of its efforts to provide a critique of the autonomy of knowledge given its differences from Bürger's avant-garde in terms of impact and aims: that it is almost unknown outside of social science and that it seeks to understand rather than undermine the institutions of knowledge production? Telling the story of this legacy would entail a detailed empirical study of the ongoing reception, spread and transformation of the sociology of knowledge through its various publics. That said, I will mention three marks the tradition has left on the concept of knowledge that continue to serve as a source of energy and criticism within social science. First, it has helped problematize the idea that there is a universal standpoint which produces the 'truest' accounts. 37 Rather than denying the possibility of making true accounts, this understanding requires reflexivity and humility from researchers. Second is the issue I have discussed frequently in this article, that knowledge gains meaning, power and legitimacy from its context and must be studied as such. Third, even if the idea existed before, the sociology of knowledge has emphasized a social constructionist perspective for understanding knowledge and social life. It has radicalized this concept, forcing us to see that not only are certain contingent phenomena socially defined, but many, if not all, of the categories in social life used to produce knowledge are the products of complicated social agreements and performances.
All three of these ideas have had some impact on the practice of social science and academia more broadly. Social construction, for example, gets batted around ubiquitously with near universal acceptance in some quarters and derision in others, but it is unclear how deeply people engage or understand the concept (Hacking, 1999) . Perhaps this situation resembles the absorption and dilution of the avant-garde art object. Just as Duchamp has created new possibilities for bad art, facile application of the term 'social construction' to knowledge claims has created possibilities for bad scholarship and misunderstandings between disciplines. The other two conceptions of knowledge, that truth and knowers must be contextualized, continue to rankle with academics as well (social scientists in particular). These ideas have proven to be very difficult to deal with; they have caused much uncertainty about the epistemological legitimacy of interpreting social life. From the perspective of this profound problem, and to the extent that the sociology of knowledge can be seen as an important originator and continuing locus for these issues, it would seem to be still functioning as a viable avantgarde. 38 The broad applicability of its ideas, the institutional context of their development and, importantly, its generally non-dogmatic attitude (at least compared to the Dadaists) have all contributed to the continuing, if subtle, critical function of the sociology of knowledge within social science.
Building on the claim that the sociology of knowledge continues to be an avant-garde for social science, I believe its critical efforts should be redoubled in relation to the problem of the reification of concepts. Recall that I argued earlier that Duchamp presented a powerful articulation of this problem in the allegory of idealization and realization found in The Large Glass and Given. The critical analogy here is double. On the one hand, we must seek to understand representations as reifications and imagine that there are other possibilities. But on the other, we must see the tendency toward reification that our studies of reification entail. It is not enough simply to 'expose' the issues in play with regard to a moment of knowledge production that we take as our object of study. We need to see the complicity of social science in the creation of those issues -how their truth has elements of contingency and arbitrariness. But at the same time, we need to follow the suggestions I have tried to tease out of Duchamp and the sociology of knowledge, that the meaning of social science research is a result of the struggle involved in truthful representation, that this involves opening up a space between the idealization of theories and the realization of descriptions, and that the tension between the two produces the delay that is constitutive of truth-making. Just as Duchamp demonstrated that the way to take art seriously was to question it, approach it ironically, not to take it too seriously, so might the sociology of knowledge help social science see that truth emerges when we loosen our grip on it.
Finally, we might wonder what we should make of the striking parallels I have demonstrated between Duchamp's work and the sociology of knowledge. Two possible explanations spring immediately to mind: that the parallels are accidental or that there is a direct influence between the two parties. The first seems highly unlikely and I have found no evidence for the second in my research. The problem begs us to look deeper. Perhaps these parallels demonstrate something like what Foucault would call a 'discursive regularity' of the 'episteme' of modernity (Foucault, 1970 (Foucault, , 1973 . In other words, maybe the characteristics Duchamp and the sociology of knowledge share, such as the examination of contexts and institutionalization, the style of immanent critique and toying with self-refutation, or, to put it into a shorthand, the turn toward reflexivity, are symptomatic or emblematic of the structure of knowledge at a certain historical juncture. 39 What other movements and thinkers might participate in this purported 'regularity'? What might it tell us more generally about the intellectual project of modern social thought, the artistic project of modernism, and their relationship? An examination of these questions and possibilities will have to await future investigation.
Appendix: On Method, Comparison and Reflexivity
Perhaps the most perplexing issue in this article is not any one of the specific claims I make but the curious character of the comparison. Indeed most of the criticism this article has received, which is often framed in terms of questions or problems about one or another claim, is actually a response to some aspect of the comparison of Duchamp to the sociology of knowledge. Comparing Duchamp and his ideas (individual level) to the sociology of knowledge (group or field/institution level) might seem like comparing apples to oranges -or even orange trees. Other possible comparisons would be less troubling. For example, it might be more satisfying to compare Duchamp directly to another individual, such as Harold Garfinkel (perhaps the sociological thinker whose image most resembles Duchamp's sophisticated gadfly status) or Karl Mannheim, or else to embed Duchamp in an artistic movement, such as Dada and compare that to the sociology of knowledge as a movement. These kinds of comparison would allow an explicitly sociological analysis, one that could compare individual or group trajectories and positions within institutional settings. It is ironic, then, that this article, which attempts to analyze the sociology of knowledge, the field of sociology perhaps most dedicated to this kind of analysis, does not attempt to situate it or Duchamp in their institutional contexts in a sophisticated way. The comparison, rather than being historically specific and sociologically motivated, is more suggestive and philosophical. Although I do not make any ontological claim about the 'context independence' of the ideas explored within, for the most part the epistemological comparison is treated chiefly as one of ideas and concepts disembedded from the conditions of their genesis. This level of irreflexivity in an article that is substantially about reflexivity may seem problematic, but to this I have two responses.
First, this article would only be aided by a robust sociology (and history) applied to the main individual and institutional 'characters'. This effort would show how the various claims were strategic positions staked out in response to those held by others as well as abiding themes within and outside the particular intellectual fields. What's more, it would demonstrate that many claims were only possible because of the positions occupied by claims-makers -for example, Fountain could only be made by an institutionally sanctioned artist, but arguably the fact that Duchamp was a French émigré in the USA (at the time a country barely exposed to the avant-garde) was also key. The present article, then, should be seen as a prolegomenon to a larger sociological and historical project that would embed the ideas suggested here in their social and intellectual contexts. These tasks would also be necessary to demonstrate the Foucauldian suggestions I make in the conclusion.
My second response is that a more proper apple-to-apple comparison, whether or not it included a reflexively adequate sociological account, would miss some of the interesting speculations and juxtapositions I made. It could be argued that the article is really about a comparison of the sociology of knowledge to the avant-garde and Duchamp is standing in as a trope for or emblem of avant-garde-style intellectual 'moves'. But this tack leaves no room for the discussion of delay, representation and reification, and eliminates the specificity of Duchamp in the article. In contrast, it could be argued that the article is really about the comparison of Mannheim to Duchamp and that the sociology of knowledge is superfluous to the discussion. This reading is the opposite of the last one; thus it supports the detailed claims about Duchamp and Mannheim, but eliminates the larger set of claims about the avant-garde and the sociology of knowledge as analogous critical enterprises.
I am therefore reluctant to 'clean up' the comparison because holding up an apple to an orange tree has, in this case, generated an interconnected set of comparisons and claims that gain much from the somewhat discomfiting juxtaposition of elements. In the end, then, this article has demonstrated a different kind of reflexivity by being true to the claims made above about reification, the constraints of form and concepts, and the epistemological benefit of 'loosening one's grip'. By refusing to reify 'comparison', by challenging the dictates of its form, I have brought forward insights that would have otherwise remained hidden or isolated from each other. And this 'refusal' is not a rejection of the concept of comparison, an anti-foundational call for 'anything goes!' Instead it is a gentle experiment that acknowledges the likelihood of objections and difficulties, but hopes to stretch a concept and let it play. Notes I thank Craig Calhoun, Troy Duster, Thomas Ertman, David Garland, Dorothy Nelkin, Mary Poovey, the members of the workshop on Culture, Institutions, and Social Action at NYU (especially discussants, Neil Brenner and Alexandra Kowalski-Hodges), and the editors of Theory, Culture & Society and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and criticisms. 1. When I use the terms 'reify' or 'reification' in this article I am referring to the prosaic definition meaning 'thing-ify' or 'hypostatize' rather than the sense developed by Lukács (1971) and others to describe the effects of commodification on consciousness.
2. The title is half of the work's content: a pun when pronounced in French, it translates as 'she has a hot ass'. Moure (1988) and Schwartz (1996) provide reproductions of most of Duchamp's work. 3. Seigel (1995: 140-2) has argued that even the clear iconoclasm of L.H.O.O.Q. is better understood in terms of Duchamp's other abiding interests. 4. In emphasizing the 'institutional critique' aspect of Duchamp's work in this article, it is arguable that I am reducing his concerns to those of Dada. However, I disagree with this argument, first because some of Duchamp's other concerns (such as delay, methodology and 'anti-reificationism') are important for this article and, second, because Duchamp's institutional critique is much more analytical and reflexive (especially in his exploration of the reproduction of art and exploitation of art as a market) than the Dadaist's iconclastic nihilism. 5. Seigel (1995: 116-17 and elsewhere) discusses Duchamp's conception of the suppression of habit as a condition of freedom. Duchamp's 'objectivity' was therefore a means of achieving personal freedom and 'anti-fixity'. But couldn't objectivity become a habit as well, thus constraining freedom? Luckily, Duchamp did not adhere to his objectivity dogmatically. 6. Duchamp's critical efforts, while containing many original gestures, certainly proceed from as well as advance a more general critical impulse characteristic of 'Modernism' as a movement. 7. Tomkins (1996: 179-89) provides an account of the stir which Fountain caused when it was submitted for the 1917 show of the Society for Independent Artists in New York. 8. Entertaining examples of this aspect of the ready-mades abound; see Tomkins (1996: 185-6 ) for comparisons of Fountain to a Brancusi, a seated Buddha and the head of a Madonna. Seigel (1995: 126) argues that the ready-mades were also 'signs of [Duchamp's] own preoccupations, projecting his inner cosmos of associations onto things encountered in everyday life'. See Camfield (1990) for a complete history of Fountain. 9. Seigel (1995) makes much of the anti-fixity impulse in Duchamp's work. 10. This, of course, is where Duchamp and Dada dovetail, but an overemphasis on this disruptive element to the exclusion of his other ideas is what makes some (especially conservative) critics see Duchamp as no more than a Dadaist. 11. Duchamp's own Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2 (1912) , is one of the few paintings that has come close to accomplishing this feat. Works by Lichtenstein and Warhol provide examples from mid-century. In fact, the Pop art movement in which these two artists played major roles replayed many of the epistemological challenges posed by Duchamp but in the context of America's post-war consumer culture. 12. It would be interesting to study how gate-keeping functions in art institutions have evolved to handle the kinds of changes wrought by Duchamp and others. They certainly still exist in the institutions of galleries, museums, critics and the public (not many people carrying toilets in from the street get into MoMA), but they cannot rely as comfortably on seemingly transparent categories like beauty and craft. 13. See Danto (1984 Danto ( , 1987 Danto ( , 1997 for discussion of shifts in the criteria for judging art in the 20th century. 14. The Green Box was published in book form. See Duchamp (1976) . 15. Elias's discussion of involvement and detachment dovetails closely with his theory of the development of the social and psychological bases of control in European societies as laid out in The Civilizing Process (1994) . 16. Barnes (1977) , Bloor (1977) and MacKenzie (1981) are the major representatives of the Edinburgh School. There are many other sociologists of science who bear the legacy of the sociology of knowledge in current academic work. See, for example, Pickering (1984) and Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983) . Unfortunately, I do not have the space to consider their contributions here. 17. See Hacking (1999: esp. ch . 1) for a discussion of the different critical dispositions of social constructionism which is also relevant to the sociology of knowledge. 18. 'Objectivity' is a highly contested concept in the social sciences and science generally. Here I am using the simple, common-sense notion of objectivity as a removal of bias or an indifference to outcome. 19. Mannheim would realize that the social world is not so simple as to be divided into two simple camps. There exist, for example, various reformers between ideologues and utopians, and a multitude of voices and ideas exist within those camps. 'Ideology' and 'utopia' in his work are ideal types in the Weberian sense. 20. Mannheim originated many of his ideas in the 1920s, soon after the Russian revolution, when debates between socialists and liberals were particularly polarized. Ideology and Utopia was in part an effort to find a way to transcend the positions of both sides. See Louis Wirth's preface to Ideology and Utopia and Aronowitz (1988: 272-300) . 21. Toulmin (1990) would argue that it is a confusion bequeathed to us by the Cartesian legacy of the quest for certainty and the schism between subject and object. 22. Mannheim discusses this situation, albeit more abstractly. He describes the inadvertent analytical importation of 'metaphysical-ontological value-judgements ' (1936: 78-80) , rather than the implicit critique of power I have mentioned. 23. See Garfinkel (1967) and Psathas (1989) . Goffman (1967 Goffman ( , 1974 (who, it is important to note, was not an ethnomethodologist despite sharing their focus on the everyday context of interpersonal interaction) investigated the intricate interactions of face-to-face encounters; while these studies take us far from institutions of knowledge production, they still demonstrate complexity and similarity to other examples of knowledge production. Incidentally, the accounts of these authors also bear structural resemblance to the relationship between bride and bachelors in The Large Glass. 24. See note 9. 25. Here again we encounter Duchamp's emphasis on the cognitive over the aesthetic in the visual. 26. Lynch (1985) and Garfinkel et al. (1981) are important ethnomethodological accounts of scientific research. Latour and Woolgar (1986) and Traweek (1988) are just a few of a good number of anthropologists of science who share many interests, attitudes, theories and methods with the sociology of knowledge. 27. This brief discussion doesn't take into account some of the complexity of the conceptual 'order' issue: Kaufmann is trying to distinguish between the natural and social sciences, but it is clear that sometimes natural scientists are dealing with second-order constructs (i.e. reinterpretations of concepts their peers have named), and arguably social scientists (especially those purporting to work in a more 'positivist' mode) can generate first-order constructs sometimes.
28. See Gould (1981) for a discussion of scientific efforts to identify biological accounts of intelligence differences by race. 29. Arguably, artists in general are more like scientists than sociologists in that they engage primarily in first-order 'namings' and second-order manipulations of their peers' products (see note 28). Duchamp's problematization of the order distinction makes him different. It is arguable, however, that Duchamp's various reflexive critiques, including the order-blurring work of the ready-mades, are actually second-order manipulations of critiques launched by earlier generations of avantgarde artists. 30. Mannheim actually thought he had solved this problem and had provided a solid ground for his relational sociology of knowledge. In 'The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge ' Mannheim (1952) grounds his theory in the historically emergent contemporary standards of social scientific knowledge. In other words, the theory is founded in then-present historical conditions. This is an interesting strategy, but despite Mannheim's hope it is not stably 'grounded' in usual senses of the term. Elias (1987) addressed this problem in a more successful way with his theory of the social and historical processes by which different societies can attain different capacities to produce 'reality-congruent' knowledge. 31. The skeptical reader might object that I have made the somewhat staid and conservative Mannheim look almost like a 'postmodernist'. I understand that Mannheim was actually motivated by a relatively conservative theoretical project -at least from the perspective of the Frankfurt School for example (Horkheimer, 1972) . From the passages I analyze, it is not difficult to discern a genuine anxiety about resolving the problems of knowledge his theory generates; this is clearly the motivation for his creation of the problematic 'free-floating' research position. Ultimately, while the interpretation I give to Mannheim may not be one he himself would have advanced, it does, I believe, follow from his argument. 32. Another of Duchamp's ironies -representing the fluid 'truth' of desire in crystalline glass. 33. I use Bürger's theory of the avant-garde for my analysis because its focus on institutions resonates with sociological inquiry. Poggioli (1968) provides perhaps the best-known theory of the avant-garde, but his analysis is concerned with a broader conception of avant-gardes and their periodization rather than the specific institutional-critical impulse on which Bürger focuses. Also, for Bürger 'avantgarde' refers to certain late 19th-to early 20th-century artistic movements and not as much to vanguard movements within institutional settings generally. 34. Bürger goes on to discuss the adaptability of the institution of art to provocative gestures such as these. By accepting them into the canon of art, the market and museums transform the meaning of subsequent gestures. In Bürger's example (1984: 52-3) , signing a stovepipe now and submitting it to a gallery would not undermine the ideal of an individual producer, but would instead affirm the impish genius of Duchamp, the individual artist. 35. Brotchie's (1995) A Book of Surrealist Games, which includes examples of some rules they used and the results, demonstrates the surrealist avant-garde's playful, social conception of art. 36. This claim is a controversial one. After all, arguably the media, advertising and the commodification of design (as opposed to pre-capitalist craft) have created a ubiquitous, and often unwelcome, presence of aestheticized objects and images in daily life. However, the avant-garde's targets of criticism included the bourgeois lifestyle of consumption and, to a lesser extent, proletarianized production. Thus, the type of integration of art with life wrought by contemporary forms of advertising was unanticipated by the avant-garde, and it is unclear whether this integration should be considered a success, or their success. 37. In contrast, Mannheim's free-floating intellectual continually has to renegotiate her standpoint vis-a-vis social relations in order to produce true accounts. 38. Arguably, the latest ('postmodern') phase of this reflexive, foundational critique in the interpretive social sciences has been generated by, and mainly confined to, anthropology. At least in the United States, sociology has been relatively resistant to these debates. The sociology of knowledge cannot 'take credit' for these epistemological uncertainties, but through post-Mertonian, constructionist social studies of science it has been in deep dialog with the other loci of the critique. 39. Despite mention of 'structures' and 'discourse', this suggestion need not imply an internalist account of knowledge. For example, Berman (1982) provides an account of modernist thought which describes its structural and discursive regularities but that links and explains them with reference to capitalism and its dynamic effects on modern life.
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